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Abstract:  
Understanding how tourist firms set their online prices is important due to their 
growing reliance on Online Travel Agencies (OTA). Little is known, however, about 
whether differences exist in the online pricing approaches adopted by hotels using an OTA. 
The article tests, using a big data approach, whether the diffuse narrative of a pervasive 
presence of dynamic pricing provides a realistic description of hotels’ pricing behavior and 
thus challenges the view that dynamic pricing should be considered the prevailing norm for 
the industry. The evidence suggests a heterogenous attitude across hotels, with uniform 
pricing being more widespread in most hotels of our sample, namely, the 3-star or less, 
while dynamic pricing is more likely applied in higher quality hotels. 
Keywords: Revenue Management; Online travel agents; Heterogeneous strategic 
management behaviour; dynamic pricing. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the enormous importance of such Online Travel Agents (OTAs) as 
Booking.com or Expedia as a key distribution channel for many hospitality firms, very little 
is known about the way such firms set and manage their prices on the OTAs platforms. 
From a technological viewpoint, a platform enhances price transparency and lowers menu 
costs, i.e., the cost incurred by a firm when it modifies its price, thereby contributing to the 
creation of a frictionless market, as originally hypothesized in Bryniolfsson and Smith 
(2000). From an economic perspective, companies that use OTAs as distribution channels 
must set their prices in a context where competition is intensified on both the supply side 
(more firms against which to compete) and on the demand side, with consumers better 
informed and potentially capable to choose among alternative destinations located afar from 
each other (Andrés-Martínez et al., 2014: 172).  
Prima facie, both perspectives implicitly call for a somewhat sophisticated pricing 
approach capable of allowing a firm to adapt to the varying market conditions that prevail 
on the platform. Indeed, as Noone and Mattila (2009: 272) observe “... the growth of the 
Internet as a channel of distribution has significantly increased customer exposure to 
revenue management pricing practices”. This works aims to better qualify such a statement 
by investigating whether the propensity to apply such techniques is widespread in the 
universe of firms, or is instead largely heterogeneous and thus can be related to specific 
firms and market attributes (Dolnicar and Ring, 2014).  
So far, the academic literature has mostly focused on the theoretical reasons why the 
adoption of Revenue Management (RM) pricing techniques manifest itself in price variation 
over time (McAfee and te Velde, 2007; Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). The empirical studies 
based on the airline industry robustly support the notion of an intense intertemporal 
dynamism in the fares set by both low-cost carriers (Alderighi et al., 2015) and full-service 
carriers (Bilotkach et al., 2010; Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009). In 
hotel markets, intertemporal pricing also appears to be an important empirical regularity, 
although little attention has been given to whether it characterizes the price setting behavior 
of all the firms in the sample (Abrate et al., 2012; Fleischer, 2012). An exception in the 
literature is Abrate and Viglia (2016), whose approach, which explicitly controls for the 
presence of heterogeneous behavior in the use of intertemporal pricing across hotel 
operators, is in line with the findings from a survey carried out by the Global Business 
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Travel Association (GBTA) in 2014, where it emerged that although 75% of the respondents 
declared to be aware of the possibility to use Dynamic Pricing (DP) to manage their hotel 
rates, only 22% made active use of it (GBTA, 2014).  
This article’s main contribution to the travel and tourism literature consists in 
shedding empirical light on the heterogenous intertemporal pricing behaviour of hospitality 
firms operating on an OTA. It tests whether the use of an online platform is, as predicted by 
the literature and the media, accompanied by an intensive RM approach revealed by a 
frequent change in the posted price of a hotel room. To this purpose, data were collected 
using a special software programmed to issue queries on the online platform of 
Booking.com (Abrate and Viglia, 2016; Fleischer, 2012). The queries were for the duration 
of one night in hotels based in many seaside localities of the four main Mediterranean 
islands of Sardinia, Sicily, Corsica, and the Balearics. The sample covers days of stay during 
the period from 1st April to 30th September, which is much longer than the one adopted in 
existing studies and thus enables a comparison across different parts of the seaside holiday 
season; it also covers two consecutive years (2014 and 2015). The data refer to double rooms 
in hotels with a star classification, whose prices are tracked at regular intervals prior to each 
date of stay, thus allowing us to study the evolution of posted prices over a 70-days period, 
denoted as “booking period”, and the extent by which each establishment engages in 
dynamic changes of its offered prices.  
The empirical analysis aims at developing a set of stylised facts characterising the 
temporal pricing profile adopted by a wide variety of hotels. Such facts arise as a direct 
answer to the following research questions: 
1. How widespread is the adoption of DP strategies among the hotels that use an online 
platform? 
2. Are there differences in the use of these strategies, in relation to such factors as the type 
of structure (e.g., its star classification), the area in which it is located, the number of 
days separating the query from the “day of stay”, the customers’ ratings and the period 
of stay during the season? 
3. Conditional on observing a price change during two consecutive dates in the booking 
period, which of the above factors are more strongly associated with the probability that 
the change corresponds to a price increment?  
To anticipate results, we find no evidence in our data in support of the view that the 
majority of hotels are constantly reprogramming their yields by frequently adjusting their 
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rooms’ prices. Furthermore, our empirical analysis strongly indicates an heterogenous, and 
previously unreported, propensity towards online DP across the firms in the sample. Star 
classification appears to be the strongest discriminant factor, with higher quality hotels (i.e., 
4 and 5 star) always showing to be the most active in terms of DP, regardless of the way in 
which we measure it. Symmetrically, lower quality hotels (3 star or less), which make up 
the great bulk of enterprises in the data, exhibit a low propensity to vary prices over time, 
despite the reduced “frictions” made available by the OTA’s platform in terms of low menu 
costs and easier observability of competitors’ prices.  Although our data collection is similar 
to that in Abrate and Viglia (2016), we cover different periods and geographical areas, and 
reach a rather different conclusion, in so far as their findings suggest more price dynamism, 
i.e., a larger coefficient of variation, in lower quality firms. Furthermore, another 
contribution of this study is to suggest the presence of countervailing factors preventing or 
hindering the widespread adoption of intense DP techniques, such as for instance, the fear 
that DP may be perceived as unfair by customers (Choi and Mattila, 2004; Heo and Lee, 
2011; Orbach and Einav, 2007). 
As far as the second research question is concerned, in addition to the star 
classification, another factor that appear to play a role in explaining the heterogeneous 
propensity to vary prices over time is the period during the season. In both years, a much 
larger proportion of price variations is observed during the period from July to September; 
moreover, holding the period fixed, more variations took place in 2015 than in 2014. 
Interestingly, firms with similar characteristics exhibit a similar pricing behaviour across 
the four regions, an indication that the propensity to vary prices inter-temporally is robustly 
associated with the factors used in the empirical analysis. 
Finally, the third research question investigates more closely whether the price 
variation corresponds to an increase or a decrease. At an early stage of the booking period, 
the probability that a price change corresponds to a price increase is above fifty percent for 
most types of star classifications (i.e., price increases dominate over decreases), but such a 
percentage declines as the end of the booking period approaches. That is, in all macro-
destinations, during the three weeks preceding the day of stay the probability of a price drop 
dominates, in line with the common belief that last-minute discounts are offered by hotels 
to improve their load factors (Mauri, 2012).  
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2. Literature review and main research questions 
Revenue Management (henceforth, RM) refers to a broad set of price-setting 
techniques that are profitably used by such companies as airlines, hotels, car retails, cruise 
shipping, etc. In such industries customers are heterogeneous, i.e., they have different 
willingness to pay and may learn at different point in time whether they need to buy the 
service; demand is uncertain, in the sense that peak demand may occur unexpectedly; the 
service is highly perishable (Kimes, 1989). In its simplest formulation, RM entails a trade-
off between accepting now a booking request at a given price or refusing it leaving the 
unsold capacity available tomorrow for a potential customer willing to pay a higher price 
(McGill and van Ryzin, 1999). 
The existing literature on RM has highlighted a set of major drivers that are expected 
to enhance or hinder price variation over time in travel and tourism markets (see for example 
Balaguer and Pernias, 2013; Chen and Schwartz, 2008). We will consider them in the two 
subsequent subsections. In the whole Section, unless otherwise specified, we will refer to 
“firms” to indicate both airlines and hotels, the types of enterprises on which the literature 
on RM has mostly focussed. 
2.1 Factors expected to be positively associated with dynamic pricing. 
Intertemporal price variation can be revealed by either upward or downward 
adjustments in the current price. The factors driving prices in either directions are often 
correlated with time, that is, the temporal distance that separates the date the service was 
booked from the date of consuming it (i.e., the travel date for airlines or the date of stay for 
hotel). We first consider those factors that are expected to lead to price increases, and then 
discuss the factors expected to drive prices in the opposite direction.  
First, because consumers may be heterogeneous along such relevant dimensions as 
their willingness to pay for the service or the uncertainty on whether they need to travel, 
firms may want to try to segment the market and price discriminate the business travellers' 
segment from other lower demand travellers, e.g., those travelling for leisure or for visiting 
friends and family. Indeed, business travellers, in comparison to the other group, can 
generally afford to pay a higher premium. The temporal effect is induced by the fact that 
business people are more likely to discover whether they need to travel only a few days 
before the consumption date and their choice of travelling dates is therefore very inflexible; 
in such circumstances, it should be expected that the prices of flights and hotel rooms 
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increase a few days before the day of travel. (Alderighi et. al. 2016; Gaggero and Piga, 2011; 
Gale and Holmes, 1993). 
Second, firms may respond to the online presence of strategic customers, i.e., those 
who may postpone the purchase in anticipation of last-minute discounts, by committing to 
raise prices over time to discourage such behaviour (Li et al., 2014). Such a strategy is still 
compatible with price reductions, as long as these occur randomly and do not disrupt the 
overall increasing temporal trend of prices (Deneckere and Peck, 2012; Sweeting, 2012). 
Thirdly, and most importantly, an important aspect of RM in airline markets is 
denoted as “inventory control”. It consists in setting i) ticket classes, i.e., fare levels and 
associated restrictions (refundability, advance purchase, business vs. economy, etc.) and ii) 
defining the number of seats available at each fare. The equivalent in hotel markets would 
be, assuming identical room characteristics, deciding i) the relevant booking classes and ii) 
the number of rooms to sell in each class. Dana (1999) demonstrates, using advanced 
mathematical techniques within a model where all units of capacity (airlines seats or hotel 
rooms) are homogenous, that it is optimal for firms to divide their capacity into “buckets”, 
each characterised by a varying number of seats or rooms and by a monotonically increasing 
price level. The units in a bucket are all sold at the same price, and once they sell out, the 
price moves automatically upwards to the next bucket’s price level. Alderighi et al. (2015) 
test the implications of Dana’s model for the case of the airline industry; they find that an 
increasing intertemporal fare profile is strongly driven by the increasing scarcity of available 
seats, that is, the fare goes up as the plane fills up. Dana (1999) assumes price discrimination 
away, and the monotonically increasing price profile that arises in equilibrium is ascribable 
to differences in the shadow cost of each unit of capacity; therefore, the findings in Alderighi 
et al. (2015), further extended in Alderighi et al. (2016) suggest that having information on 
the load factor of an aircraft or hotel at the time a price is posted, is necessary to disentangle 
an intertemporal price discrimination motive from cost-based pricing. In this work, we do 
not have information of the number of rooms available in the hotel at the time a price was 
posted; this is not a limitation, because both intertemporal price discrimination and cost-
based pricing related to inventory control are expected to operate in the same direction to 
produce a variation in room prices, which is the focus of our empirical strategy. 
Abrate et al. (2012) study whether the temporal structure of hotel prices depends on 
the composition of customers’ type, defined by the motivation of stay. They argue that on 
weekdays the hotels serve a larger proportion of business customers, while on weekends 
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hotels serve predominantly leisure ones. Based on the price of a single room posted online 
between three months and one day before the stay by about 1000 hotels in eight European 
capitals, the evidence reveals that over 90% of prices changed during the period, and that 
the intertemporal price profile varies depending mainly on the mix of customers the hotels 
anticipate they will be serving.  
Prices may be dropped for two main theoretical reasons. One, hotels and airlines 
offer a highly perishable product. Because an unsold seat or room carries no value for the 
firm, during the booking period, there is a strong incentive to lower prices, which are 
therefore expected to fall over time (McAfee and teVelde, 2007; Talluri and van Ryzin, 
2004). Two, a price reduction is the simplest and most straightforward method used by firms 
to stimulate a sluggish demand. To reduce learning effects that enhance strategic behaviour 
by consumers, the literature has revealed that European low-cost airlines offer secret 
discounts (Bachis and Piga, 2011) or generally apply price reductions randomly to reduce 
their predictability. Bilotkach et al. (2014) find that such price drops are effective in 
enhancing an airline’s load factor (see also Salanti, Malighetti and Redondi, 2012).  
2.2 Reasons favoring uniform pricing. 
There are both cost-based and strategic reasons why firms may choose a uniform 
pricing approach. Zbaracki et al. (2004) show that, for the case of industrial products and 
services, managerial and customer costs to change prices are relevant. They identify three 
components of managerial costs: those related to the time and attention required of managers 
to gather the information, those pertaining to the resources to make the decision and, finally, 
the communication costs to the different members of the firm, to explain the logic of the 
change. Additionally, other costs include those incurred to prepare customers to the price 
changes. They estimate that managerial costs are more than 6 times, and customer costs are 
more than 20 times, the simple cost of changing nominal prices, the so called “menu costs” 
(Bryniolfsson and Smith, 2000).  
As far as the strategic reasons favoring a uniform pricing approach are concerned, 
perceived (un)fairness, uninformed customers and demand uncertainty are often cited 
factors (Orbach and Einav, 2007).  
The (un)fairness of a price is a very controversial issue along a number of 
dimensions but above all because the perception of fairness or unfairness of a price is always 
a matter of judgment that depends on multiple factors such as the context of past purchases, 
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product knowledge and brand communication strategies both formal (advertising) and 
informal (word of mouth, online reviews). This also means that the decision to purchase is 
not only based on the price quoted by the company, but the comparison between it and the 
singular customer's idea of the current price (Kotler et al., 2015). In the travel and tourism 
industry, the high variability of prices over time constitutes an intrinsic aspect of RM and 
can therefore be perceived as "unfair" by consumers who have paid a higher price than other 
customers. In tourism, the perception of price equity/iniquity plays an important role in 
customer satisfaction and subsequent behavior (Oliver and Swan 1989). If hotel clients 
perceive RM practices as unfair, the increase in revenues resulting from such practices may 
be only short-term since it can lead to a decrease in customer satisfaction and, ultimately, 
to the reduction of their loyalty (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Kimes 2002). This 
is particularly important for online markets due to the growing reliance of customers on 
reviews and ratings issued by past customers (Mathies et. al, 2013; Leung et al., 2013)  
Because tourism and hotel services are typical examples of “experience goods” 
(Nelson, 1970), i.e., goods whose quality can only be properly assessed after consumption, 
customers could perceive the price as a quality signal; in such a case, any price drop below 
the uniform price could lead to a sharp decrease in demand. Such an effect may play a 
relevant role during the booking period for sale on a specific date of stay: if the hotel 
managers drops its price during the booking period, the potential customers may think 
something is less than ideal in either the hotel or the destination, and be deterred from buying 
(Orbach and Einav, 2007). 
Demand uncertainty may, on the other hand, explain why the same price is applied 
to all the days of stay within a given season period: indeed, hotel managers may be unable 
to predict the demand for specific dates, arguably because their prospective appeal is 
unknown. In such a case, firms may decide to treat all dates of stay in a period (say, August 
or June) identically (Orbach and Einav, 2007).  
The above discussion has highlighted drivers of both price change and uniformity; 
given their contrasting effects, we posit our: 
Research Question 1: How widespread is the adoption of DP strategies among the 
hotels that operate online? 
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2.3 The importance of the organizational design and other 
characteristics. 
Hospitality establishments differ in their degree of organizational complexity, which 
in turn may impact on the way they design and implement their pricing schemes. In the hotel 
industry, Selmi and Dornier (2011) emphasize the role of the human factor in the 
establishment and development of an effective RM system. Their qualitative analysis based 
on interviews to both general and specific revenue managers highlights a number of relevant 
points. First, both types of managers must work together to determine the hotel's strategy. 
One of the interviewees in Selmi and Dornier (2011) report that: “the job of yield [or 
revenue] manager in a hotel is very important ... in some hotels the yield manager is as 
important as the hotel manager (p. 66)”. Second, RM personnel must be properly trained 
but an understanding of RM concepts is also a requisite for hotel managers. Third, the IT 
infrastructure constitutes an invaluable source of information but it does not take away a 
revenue manager's autonomy of decision. Overall, the foregoing discussion suggests that 
the pricing scheme which a hotel applies, is the final outcome of a complex interaction 
between an organization’s characteristics, its culture and the processes linking the 
operations of the various functions (marketing, RM, etc). Because all such aspects are 
generally unknown and unobserved by the researcher, it is not possible to establish a direct 
causation between the way an organization is, broadly speaking, managed, and the pricing 
scheme it adopts. However, organizational complexity is highly positively correlated with 
such observable characteristics as the star classification or the establishment’s capacity, 
which we adopt in this study to address our:  
Research Question 2a: How is the propensity to engage in DP correlated with a 
hotel’s star category and size?  
In a study of hotels that operate under the same chain name (which may therefore 
have shared organizational practices), Kosová et al. (2013) report no significant differences 
in performance between franchised and company-owned hotels. Similarly, Hung, Shang and 
Wang (2010) find that the price in chain affiliated hotels in Taiwan does not differ 
significantly from those in independently owned ones, thus suggesting that geographically 
localized effects play an important role.  
The analysis in Fleischer (2012), which like the present study reports data extracted 
from the Booking.com website for many Mediterranean localities, focuses on whether the 
hotels charge higher prices for a room with a sea view, after controlling for such other 
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possible price shifters as type of room, inclusion of breakfast and/or half board, non-
refundability and other types of view (garden, city, etc.). The findings, which are based on 
only two specific days of stay, indicate a statistically significant “price premium” just above 
10% in both days, and no significant variation of such a premium across the sampled 
Mediterranean areas.  
Abrate and Viglia (2016) find empirical support to the hypothesis of a positive 
impact of online customer’s ratings on prices. Their empirical model also includes the 
booking time, i.e., the time interval separating the date of stay from the date a price is posted 
online. There is, at least to our knowledge, no study that looks at the relationships between 
customers’ ratings or the booking time and a firms’ propensity to engage in DP, within a 
sample that also includes multiple spatial contexts and contiguous dates of stay across a full 
tourist season. We therefore extend the Research Question 2a to include geographical, 
reputational and seasonality factors: 
Research Question 2b: How is the propensity to engage in DP correlated with the 
area in which a hotel is located, the number of days separating the room booking from the 
“day of stay”, the customers’ ratings and the period of stay during the season?  
It is worth stressing that the focus on correlation is due to the impossibility to 
establish causation effects in our research design. The straightforward implication is that 
while we cannot state that any of the factors mentioned in Research Question 2a and 2b, 
“determines” a firm’s propensity towards DP, we can evaluate the extent to which such a 
propensity co-moves with those factors.  
3. Data Collection 
The empirical investigation is based on primary data of online prices and other 
establishments' information retrieved using an "electronic web-crawler", a programme 
designed to connect directly to the website of one of the largest OTA in the world, 
Booking.com. The crawler was designed to automatically launch the online queries 
necessary to book an accommodation in a specific locality, and subsequently retrieve the 
posted prices together with information on the characteristics of the rooms offered and the 
establishment's name and rating resulting from the past customers' evaluation. Separately, 
the programme also retrieved other establishment's characteristics, including its type, its 
size measured by the number of rooms, if it is part of a chain and its star classification. In 
this work, to simplify the comparisons and provide a more direct link with the existing 
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literature, the analysis uses data only from establishments classified as Hotels, if they state 
a star classification on their Booking.com website. Furthermore, the study includes only 
double or twin rooms.  
The queries specified the most important and famous tourist seaside localities 
located in four renowned regions in the western part of the Mediterranean Sea, denoted as 
macro-destinations: the French island of Corsica, the Spanish Balearics Islands, and the 
Italian islands of Sardinia and Sicily (see the Appendix for a list of the localities). Large 
seaside cities, such as the regional capitals of Cagliari in Sardinia, Palermo in Sicily and 
Palma de Mallorca in the Balearics, were excluded from the sample because their hotels, 
unlike in smaller seaside tourist localities, face a more heterogeneous type of demand 
including both tourists and business travellers, something which may induce a different 
pricing approach.   
The period covered in our sample runs from 1st April until the 30th September. These 
denote the days of stay, which, for analytical purposes, were further divided into three sub-
periods: April-June, July-August, and September. The first and the third correspond to 
periods of medium demand, while the second one identifies the peak-season in many seaside 
resorts. The data collection was repeated in two consecutive years, 2014 and 2015. 
Similar to the approach followed in many airline studies (Alderighi et. al., 2015; 
Bachis and Piga, 2011; Bilotkach et al., 2010), the web crawler operated daily and was 
programmed to issue queries specifying dates of stay which differed from the query date by 
a specific set of time intervals. For a "hotel/day of stay" combination, the crawler requested 
prices 70, 65, 60, 55, 50, 45, 40, 35 30, 25, 20, 14, 7, 4 and 1 day prior to the date of stay, 
which henceforth we denote as the booking time. It is noteworthy that, for a given date of 
stay, booking time and consequently prices may not have been collected for the whole 
booking period if an establishment reached full capacity utilization early in the booking 
period (or decided to stop posting prices on Booking.com on specific dates of stay). So only 
combinations of "hotel/day of stay" with at least 5 prices retrieved on different booking 
times, were considered in the statistical and econometric analysis. All prices were retrieved 
in British Sterling (GBP). 
Table 1 provides the number of hotels in each macro-destination, broken down by 
period of stay and class classification. In all macro-destinations, i) the number of hotels in 
each star classification remains quite stable across period; ii) at least seventy percent of 
hotels are classified as either 3- or 4-star, a proportion that reaches ninety percent in 
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Sardinia; iii) in Sardinia and Sicily, the incidence of 5-star hotels is about seven percent, 
slightly higher than in Corsica and Balearics (slightly less than five percent), where, 
however, we record a larger presence of 1- and 2-star hotels.  
Table 2 clearly shows that, holding the star classification fixed, prices vary across 
the season in both years, with higher prices for stays in July-August, followed by those in 
September and in April-June. It is noteworthy that in this work, seasonal adjustments of 
price are not considered as evidence of DP, which we identify only in terms of price 
variations across the booking times, holding the date of stay fixed. Within each period of 
stay and macro-destinations, the retrieved prices are ranked, as expected, in line with the 
star classification.  
4. Descriptive evidence 
Some preliminary answers to both research questions, based on descriptive statistics, 
can be found in Table 3, which reports the likelihood of a price variation (either an increase 
or a decrease) between two consecutive booking times, holding the date of stay fixed. The 
row “Total” reports values in each macro-destination, broken down by period of stay: it 
therefore sheds some light on the extent by which DP is widespread in each geographical 
area. Despite the maximum five days’ distance between booking times, the proportions of 
observations with a variation is generally below twenty percent in all periods, with a peak 
of about twenty-five percent in July-August 2015; it is always the lowest in the April-June 
period in both years, although there appears to have been more price dynamism in 2015. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that less than one hotels in five, in every macro-destination, 
changed its online room prices during two consecutive sample observations of the booking 
times. 
To address the second research question, Table 3 reports the same likelihood broken 
down by star classification, and highlights important differences between types of hotels. In 
all periods, those classified as 3-star or less exhibit a much smaller propensity to change 
their online prices; the likelihood of a price variation in such establishments is less than 
fifteen percent, except for Corsica in July-September 2015 where, however, it does not reach 
the twenty percent threshold. Notably, even for higher quality hotels in 2014 the propensity 
to vary price dynamically hardly exceeds the thirty percent value; it increases in 2015, 
especially for 5-star hotels in Sardinia and Corsica during the July-August period, where it 
surpasses the fifty percent level. For 4-star hotels the likelihood of a price change, even in 
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2015, tends to stay around the thirty percent value, with only a peak of about forty-four 
percent in Corsica in July-September 2015. To sum up, the evidence in Table 3 indicates a 
generally low propensity to engage in DP in all macro-destinations, when all hotels are 
considered as an aggregate. However, the analysis based on the star classification points 
toward an heterogeneous propensity to change room prices dynamically, which is larger for 
4- and 5-star hotels. Although this is an interesting insight, before we can conclude that the 
star classification is positively correlated with hotels’ propensity to engage in DP, it is also 
necessary to control, using a multivariate analysis, for other factors that may be also 
correlated with the classification. For instance, if higher quality hotels have larger capacity, 
then the descriptive analysis based on star classification captures effects that pertain to hotel 
size.  
Before doing so, we investigate the possibility that price variations occur 
asymmetrically during the booking times’ period. As the literature review has highlighted, 
the three weeks preceding the date of stay define a period where, on the one hand, the hotels 
may want to seize the opportunity to price discriminate late bookers, but, on the other, may 
also face the risk of leaving rooms empty and thus be tempted to offer “last-minute” 
discounts. To allow comparisons with Table 3, Table 4, which reports the same likelihood 
values but broken down by different booking times, only considers price variations and does 
not distinguish between price decreases and increases; such a distinction will be investigated 
in Section 7. In 2014, there appears to be no clear-cut difference, in each period of stay, 
across booking times, except for the early period of 45-70, which indeed exhibits lower 
incidence values in both years. In all macro-destinations and across all the stay periods in 
2015, the probability to observe a price change increases as the booking times decrease (i.e., 
as the stay approaches. However even in the July-August 2015 stay period, which records 
the largest incidence of price variation, our data indicate that no more than four hotels out 
of ten tend to change their prices in the four days that precede the stay.  
To sum up, the descriptive statistical analysis suggests three main aspects with 
regards to the incidence of DP in our data: a) in all macro-destinations and a two years’ 
period, only a small proportion of hotels appears to vary their prices at each point in time; 
in this sense, DP over the booking times’ period appears to be on average a rather sporadic 
phenomenon; b) there seems to be some heterogeneity among hotels, with some, possibly 
higher quality hotels, actively involved in managing their prices over the booking period, 
while others choosing to maintain their prices fixed; c) the intensity with which price 
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variations are observed appears to be stronger during the last days of the booking period. 
All these factors will be simultaneously assessed in the following econometric analysis. 
5. Econometric methodology 
An advantage of using multivariate models arise from the possibility to evaluate and 
control for the impact of other factors that would not be feasible to include in the descriptive 
Tables of the previous Section. Another advantage comes from the possibility to estimate 
the effect of one factor in non-linear models in situations where each factor can be interacted 
with other variables. 
In the previous Section, a DP treatment is identified by a dummy variable equal to 
1 whenever we observe a change in a room’s price over two consecutive booking times. 
That is,   
  
= 1  if    
 
    
 
  > 0, where j denotes a “hotel/room type/date of stay” 
combination, and    
 
    
 
  is the absolute difference of prices in two consecutive booking 
times t. Such a specification for the treatment variable   
  
 is useful for the investigation of 
when, during the booking period, the hotels are more likely to engage in DP.  
However, the descriptive analysis in the previous section has highlighted that the 
probability that this may happen is indeed rather small at each point in time, although this 
does not rule out the possibility that all or most “hotel/room type/date of stay” combinations 
receive a DP treatment at least once during the booking period. If this were the case, then 
this would imply that most hotels manage the dates of stay dynamically, even if the 
treatment occurs sporadically over the booking period. The following treatment variable 
identifies this possibility:   
 
= 1  if ∑   
  
  > 0. The main difference between the two 
treatments is that   
 
 is independent of the booking time and can be estimated by considering 
a smaller sample which includes only one observation for each “hotel/room type/date of 
stay” combination.  
Both treatment variables are binary and are therefore estimated using a probit model 
(Wooldridge 2002):     
 
= 1    =  (  ), where     
 
= 1    denotes the probability 
that the treatment is administered, given a set of contributing factors X and G is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function, which we will use to calculate the estimated 
probabilities after the coefficients   are estimated. The set of factors X include: a dummy 
for each macro-destination, interacted separately with the customers’ Ratings, with the six 
periods of stay (April-June, July-August and September) in each year and also with three 
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dummies identifying Small, Medium and Large size hotels; a dummy for each star 
classification, interacted with the booking times’ dummies only in the regression using   
  
 
as treatment; a dummy for each Town where the hotels are located. The hotel size dummies 
were constructed using the threshold of twenty-five room to denote Small hotels; Large 
hotel have more than seventy rooms, while Medium hotels have between twenty-six and 
seventy rooms.  
The use of many categorical factors aims at generating pre-defined clusters within 
which we calculate the probability to observe a DP treatment. For instance, although the 
previous section has indicated a smaller probability of the treatment   
  
 in, say, 3-star 
hotels, it might be possible that after controlling for such factors as Ratings or hotel size, 
we might be able to find no difference between 3-star and higher class hotels. 
It is noteworthy that the variable Ratings may be simultaneously determined with 
our dependent variables, an aspect which prevents an interpretation of the econometric 
estimates in terms of causality but that does not prevent one in terms of correlation with the 
treatment (Wooldridge 2002). Indeed, on the one hand, the price discrimination due to a 
strong price variations is likely to affect an establishment's rating negatively, and may thus 
act as a deterrent to price fluctuations (Xia et al. 2004; Bolton et al. 2003); on the other, if 
a firm's competitive advantage arises from a high service quality, or if price fluctuations are 
perceived to be an industry's common practice, then a firm can freely adjust its prices 
dynamically without fearing to attract criticism from its customers (Mathies, Gudergan, 
Wang 2013; Ferguson 2014). In both cases, the hotel management may act in ways which 
we do not observe but that may target both the hotel’s online pricing approach and its need 
to maintain or improve its customers’ rating. Bearing this in mind, it is also likely that the 
simultaneity bias induced by the Ratings variable is rather negligible: indeed, the value of 
Ratings in each establishment is largely invariant over the sample period. It is thus generally 
pre-determined when the hotel managers make their observed DP decisions.  
We choose nonetheless to discuss the impact of each factor in terms of their 
correlation with the treatment because some of the factors, such as star classification, size 
or location, cannot, by themselves, be associated with a causality effect. For instance, 4 or 
5-star hotels and/or Large hotels are more likely to employ both a more complex 
organizational design and higher quality human capital; both unobserved factors are likely 
to be ultimately responsible for the observed price dynamism. Star classification and/or size 
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may well operate as their proxy, and profitably be used to investigate the second research 
question of whether different clusters exhibit a stronger than average propensity to DP. 
6. Results 
Because the estimation of both types of treatment includes a high number of 
interacted factors, reporting the list of all their coefficients would be uninformative, difficult 
to read and space consuming. Furthermore, probit models involve a non-linear estimation 
process, resulting in estimates that do not have a direct clear interpretation in terms of the 
factor’s impact on observing the treatment, a problem which is exacerbated by the need to 
omit several base categories to avoid the dummy trap. To address all these issues, all results 
are reported only in graphical form, which are obtained as follows. We first run the probit 
models as specified in the previous section. Then, using the command “Margin” in Stata, 
we calculate the predicted probability, based on the probit estimated coefficients, of 
observing the DP treatment in clusters created by considering one fixed (i.e., the macro-
destination), and two variable factors, for instance, the star classification and the hotel 
capacity. The estimated probabilities are then reported on a graph, to provide a clear image 
of differences between clusters.  
6.1 Treatment independent of the booking time 
Figures 1 to 3 report the estimated probability of   
 
, that is, the predicted proportion 
of dates of stay in which a hotel, defined by certain values of the factors, changed its prices 
during the booking period at least once. The two variable factors in Figure 1 are the star 
classification and the Rating, whose variation is measured by considering three values: 7, 8 
and 9 (i.e., Low, Medium, High). The reported values suggest a direct answer to the first 
and the second research questions. Indeed, in all macro-destinations, it appears clear that 4- 
and 5-star hotels exhibit a stronger propensity to vary their prices dynamically. To explain 
how to interpret the graphed values, consider Corsica, where clearly Rating has no 
distinguishing impact. The model estimates that out of 100 dates of stay, 5-star hotels have 
on average, applied the DP treatment in about 80 days; the proportion falls to 70 for 4-star 
hotels, it is about 50 for 3-star hotels, and slightly above 30 for 2-star ones. In the Balearics, 
the model predicts similar values for 5-, and 3-star hotels, a higher value just below 40 
percent for the 2-star category, a lower proportion of 60 percent for the 4-star one and also 
an estimate of about 30 percent in 1-star hotels. Sardinia and Sicily confirm the previous 
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finding of a divide for high quality hotels, but also exhibit a rather small difference in terms 
of Ratings within each star category. The model’s prediction indicates a mild tendency for 
highly rated establishments to adopt DP more frequently, holding the star classification 
fixed (Phillips et. al, 2016). Such a difference is not, however, statistically significant, as 
estimates from the Margin command reveal (these are not reported to save space).  
Figure 2, where Rating is replaced by the three categories of hotel size, also confirms 
the previous finding that the propensity to engage in DP tend to increase with the star 
classification, while size, like Rating, does not seem to be a correlated factor.  
In the previous Figures, the predicted probabilities reported a composite effect 
across the different stay periods in our sample. Figure 3 investigates whether hotels in the 
same star category (and macro-destination) are more or less likely to apply DP in different 
periods of the season, and in different years. In all macro-destinations, the lines for the 
April-June stay periods in both years lie below all the other lines, that is, the proportion of 
days in this period with   
 
= 1 is the lowest within each star category. For example, in 
Sardinia’s 2-star hotels, only about 30 percent of stay days in April-June receive the 
treatment, but this proportion increases to about 50 percent in all the other periods. A similar 
distinction can be made for all the star categories and is consistently found in all macro-
destinations. 
To sum up, the probability that DP is applied at least once during the booking period 
varies extensively and it is particularly low for 1- and 2-star hotels in all periods, and 
possibly for some 3-star hotels during the low-peak period of April-June. The estimates 
confirm the low probability of observing the treatment for many hotels in the sample; in 
terms of the Research question 1, this implies that DP is not very widespread across the 
universe of hotels using the Booking.com platform and that such hotels show at least an 
equal, if not stronger, propensity towards uniform pricing. Hotel size and Rating do not 
appear to be correlated with DP. As far as the Research Question 2 is concerned, the star 
classification appears to be the factor that best correlates with the probability to observe the 
treatment of DP. While the macro-destinations do not seem to be characterized by any 
visible difference, the hotels during the high peak periods in the Summer season show a 
greater propensity to adjust their prices dynamically. 
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6.2 The treatment varies with the booking time 
Relative to   
 
, the investigation of   
 
 should yield insights both on when, during 
the booking period, price variations are more likely to occur across clusters. Figure 4 reports, 
on the horizontal axis, the booking times, while each line corresponds to a star category. 
The values in the Figure complement well those reported in Table 4, which do not 
differentiate for the star category; once this is added, it appears clear that high quality hotels, 
and 5-star ones in particular, tend to have a higher than average propensity to vary their 
prices dynamically well ahead of the date of stay. Indeed, the probability to observe a price 
variation between two consecutive booking times is much higher in 5- and 4-star hotels: in 
these clusters, it fluctuates between 20 and 30 percent for 4-star hotels, and between 40 and 
50 percent for 5-star ones. In all other categories, it hardly reaches values above 10 percent. 
Quite interestingly, over the last three weeks before the stay, the difference between 
categories tends to reduce drastically, due mostly to a strong drop in the propensity of high 
quality hotels to vary their prices, but also partly to an increase in the same propensity by 
lower quality hotels.  
Figure 5 shows, in every sub-period, a growing probability of observing a price 
variation between two consecutive booking time which is due to a composite effect of the 
two opposing trends in Figure 4. The higher probabilities just a few days before the date of 
stay capture the larger weight of 3-star or less hotels, which are more numerous in every 
macro-destination. More importantly, the analysis of   
 
 confirms the previous finding that 
DP is applied with a different intensity across different periods of the Summer season, with 
the lowest probability of observing the treatment reported in April-June. However, Figure 
5 also indicates that, at least in Sardinia and Corsica, higher values characterize the 2015 
sub-periods of July-August and September than in the corresponding periods of the previous 
year. Such values are also higher in the other two macro-destinations, but less evidently. 
Anecdotal evidence reported on the local press, and also gathered by one of the authors from 
discussions with Sardinian hoteliers, suggest that in 2105, as a consequence of the terrorist 
attacks in North Africa in 2014, many European seaside destinations enjoyed a boom in 
demand. Combined with the previous finding that the April-June sub-period always exhibit 
less DP, the analysis of Figure 5 overall suggests a positive relationship between the level 
of demand and the propensity to engage in DP. Overall, the use of a second treatment 
measure confirms the robustness of the previous findings and the answers to the Research 
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Questions: DP is prevalent only in higher quality hotels, which however are less numerous 
in every locality. Therefore, our work suggests that although DP is a relevant phenomenon 
in the hotel industry, its application is on average rather sporadic, with many firms choosing 
its mirror image, i.e., uniform pricing. Thus, our findings are consistent with the survey 
results published in GBTA (2014). 
So far, the analysis has considered DP in terms of price variation (both increases and 
decreases). As Figure 5 indicates, the probability of observing such a variation is generally 
on average below 35 percent (except for Corsica in July-August 2015), although previous 
findings indicate a higher propensity for high-quality hotels. In the next section, we focus 
on whether similar conclusions could be drawn from the analysis where we distinguish 
between increases and decreases. 
7. Price increases and decreases 
To gain further insight and test previous findings’ robustness, in this section we 
consider a third type of treatment: 
  
  
= 1 if      
 
  
 
> 0  conditional on    
 
    
 
  > 0. That is, we only 
consider the observations in which we record a variation between two consecutive booking 
times, and flag those corresponding to a price increase. We can then perform an econometric 
analysis like the one of the previous section, calculate the probability of observing a price 
increase within different clusters and thus address:  
Research Question 3. Conditional on a price variation taking place, which factors 
are more correlated with the probability to observe a price increase?  
Figure 6 reports the predicted probability that a price variation corresponds to an 
increase, broken down by star category and booking times. In all macro-destinations, but 
especially in Sardinia, Sicily and the Balearics islands, between 65 and 30 days prior to the 
date of stay the increases make up the majority of price variation in all star categories. 
During the last 25 days of the booking periods, the incidence of price increases reduces, and 
therefore that of decreases becomes predominant, especially within the clusters including 
the 3- and 2-star hotels in Sardinia, Sicily and Corsica. Notably, in Corsica and the Balearics, 
the decreases dominate in all star categories during the last two weeks of the booking period, 
although the estimated probabilities differ in the two areas. In Corsica, only about 30 (70) 
percent of variations correspond to an increase (decrease), a value that drops to 20 (80) in 
the case of 2-star hotels. In the Balearics, decreases dominate with a 60 percent value which 
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does not differ across star categories. In Sardinia and Sicily, a similar finding appears to 
hold only for 3- and 2-star hotels, while higher quality hotels record a 50-50 chance to post 
either a decrease or a decrease, when they decide to vary their prices over the last two weeks 
of the booking period. Overall, Figure 6 provides some support to the notion that prices 
posted in the final part of the booking period are the result of two conflicting forces. On the 
one hand, the perishable nature of hotel rooms tends to drive prices down; on the other, if 
prices were consistently dropped within two weeks of the stay date, potential buyers would 
soon learn to postpone their purchases, thereby exacerbating the need for hotels to lower the 
price. As suggested in Li et al. (2014), hotels should therefore commit to an increasing price 
profile. Indeed, whenever a price variation is observed, such a variation is more likely to be 
an increase during the early part of the booking period (i.e., at least until 30 days before the 
stay date). Furthermore, although the proportion of decreases dominate in the final part of 
the booking period, these are overall not very likely to be observed. For instance, consider 
the Balearics in Figure 6, where on average 60 percent of variations in the last 14 days of 
the booking period are decreases. As previous findings in Table 4 and Figure 5 indicate, the 
probability of observing a variation during the same period is about 20 percent on average; 
therefore, the probability of a price decrease hinges, roughly speaking, around the 12 percent 
value, corresponding to one hotel in eight dropping its room price.  
Figure 7 jointly considers how the probability of observing a price increase 
(decrease) i) varies during the season; ii) is affected by a positive exogenous demand shock 
like the one all macro-destinations experienced in 2015; iii) varies across the booking times. 
Interestingly, for all the 2015 periods in all macro-destinations, the probability to observe 
an increase follows a very similar pattern across the booking times: it stays above 50 percent 
everywhere but Corsica, where it drops around 40 percent in the last 14 days of the booking 
horizon. Previously, we suggested that a lower demand characterized the 2014 season 
relative to that in 2015; notably, the model predicts a lower incidence of price increases for 
the three 2014 sub-periods in Corsica; in the other macro-regions, one or two 2014 sub-
periods report the lowest incidence of price increases for all the booking times. Thus, price 
decreases appear to be more likely applied when the hotel needs to revitalize aggregate 
demand; in such cases, decreases make up the greatest proportion of price variations even 
at an early stage of the booking period. Because decreases are also more likely during the 
last 14 days of the booking period, i.e., when the hotel managers have a clear understanding 
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of the realized demand, the estimates also confirm the “last-minute discounts” role normally 
assigned to price decreases, i.e., that of boosting a hotel’s load factor on particular dates.  
To sum up, the analysis aimed at providing an answer to Question 3 indicates that 
the probability to observe a price increase whenever a DP is applied: i) is lower for hotels 
of the 3-star category or lower, especially in the last three weeks of the booking period; ii) 
was lower in 2014. 
8. Discussion and concluding remarks 
The statistical analysis was designed to derive a set of stylized facts capable to 
suggest an answer to three research questions highlighted in the Introduction and in the 
Literature review section.  
The answer to the first question distinguishes between two different types of 
treatments. In one case, we focus on whether at least one instance of price variation is 
observed during the booking period preceding the day of stay. We find that the answer to 
this question crucially depends on the hotel’s star classification. For instance, for higher 
quality hotels (i.e., 4 and 5 star) on average about 60-80 percent of the days appear to be 
treated, i.e., they varied the price of a room at least once over the booking period. However, 
for lower quality hotels (3 star or less), the proportion falls well below 40 percent. In the 
other case, we investigate the probability that a price variation is observed between two 
sequential days in the booking period; for example, whether the price for a double room 
offered 40 days before the stay is different from the one posted 35 days before. The evidence 
is strongly in favour of a rather static pricing approach by hotels classified as 4 star or less: 
for such establishments, which make up the great bulk of enterprises in the data, the 
probability to observe a price change over two sequential booking days ahead of the stay is 
less than 30 percent. The findings in both cases thus reveal a low propensity to vary prices 
over time, despite the reduced “frictions” made available by the OTA’s platform in terms 
of low menu costs and easier observability of competitors’ prices. Although our approach 
is thus in line with that in Abrate and Viglia (2016), their findings suggest more price 
dynamism in lower quality firms. 
As far as the second research question is concerned, the statistical analysis reveals 
that hotels tend to apply DP differently across the Season periods: for instance, uniform 
pricing, i.e., the mirror image of DP, tends to prevail in the low-peak months of April-June, 
but it is less likely found during the last part of the booking period.  
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The star classification does not appear to be a strong discriminant factor in the 
prediction of a price increase, whose likelihood is lower during the last days preceding the 
date of stay and in off-peak months during the Summer seasons. 
The overall analysis suggests a set of managerial implications. First, the absence of 
online, and therefore easily visible, price variation for many firms may indicate a 
willingness to signal to potential competitors their intention to relax price competition by 
sticking to a set price (Gan and Hernandez, 2013). While this may be a viable strategy if the 
firm can achieve high enough occupancy rates, it could become a problem if the price 
stickiness leads to the reduction in arrivals at the destination level. Second, because active 
dynamic RM is more likely observed for firms that are vertically differentiated (that is, the 
4- and 5-star hotels), those that are not may need to be incentivized by the Destination 
Management Organization (DMO) to seek marketing strategies aimed at revamping their 
products and expanding the set of ancillary services they offer. The investigation of the link 
between RM and the overall marketing mix adopted by a firm is left to future, possibly 
qualitative, research. 
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Table 1 – Number of hotels by destination, period of stay and star classification. 
 Stars Apr-Jun14 Jul-Aug14 Sep14 Apr-Jun15 Jul-Aug15 Sep15 
Sardinia 
1 1 - - - 1 - 
2 3 2 4 3 2 2 
3 96 94 100 106 97 101 
4 89 98 98 94 89 85 
5 12 15 15 15 16 15 
Total 201 209 217 218 205 203 
Sicily 
1 2 3 - 3 3 3 
2 17 16 15 19 17 15 
3 74 72 66 86 86 82 
4 56 59 55 62 64 65 
5 10 10 10 11 10 10 
Total 159 160 146 181 180 175 
Corsica 
2 28 27 28 29 28 30 
3 85 84 85 92 92 92 
4 24 24 24 27 25 26 
5 6 6 6 7 6 8 
Total 143 141 143 155 151 156 
Balearics 
1 39 28 38 39 32 38 
2 57 53 56 55 45 56 
3 128 116 116 134 112 116 
4 117 116 111 140 123 110 
5 14 15 16 19 16 16 
Total 355 328 337 387 328 336 
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Table 2 – Mean price of a double room in hotel by period of stay and star classification 
 Stars Apr-Jun14 Jul-Aug14 Sep14 Apr-Jun15 Jul-Aug15 Sep15 
Sardinia 
1 49.0 - - - 61.0 - 
2 52.8 62.3 58.4 50.2 78.7 57.2 
3 62.0 84.0 65.5 53.7 82.3 59.3 
4 99.5 159.0 123.5 97.0 148.6 114.4 
5 173.5 395.0 280.1 227.4 440.3 234.5 
N 88,411 65,574 39,202 41,744 52,195 23,998 
Sicily 
1 58.1 70.4 - 44.3 58.0 52.4 
2 62.0 73.0 70.7 50.1 66.6 62.0 
3 76.1 82.2 74.4 64.4 76.0 69.9 
4 121.0 124.2 119.7 100.5 109.0 108.0 
5 228.9 246.3 276.8 214.2 222.1 218.5 
N 50,783 67,679 22,757 30,118 52,720 20,364 
Corsica 
2 65.5 74.8 63.1 52.9 65.7 57.6 
3 95.2 107.9 93.7 78.0 98.4 84.5 
4 188.9 207.4 185.4 146.5 209.1 158.1 
5 311.0 395.5 317.6 241.0 277.5 243.9 
N 23,279 43,809 26,001 30,709 39,423 16,232 
Balearics 
1 41.3 65.9 45.0 30.0 56.3 41.0 
2 45.9 69.8 56.2 36.5 59.3 44.4 
3 71.9 103.6 98.3 55.2 86.6 73.8 
4 109.8 149.1 137.0 95.1 133.3 120.4 
5 224.2 279.7 245.0 163.9 292.6 231.4 
 N 78,406 100,247 42,777 58,828 63,053 33,467 
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Table 3 – Percentage of observations with price variation between two consecutive booking 
days, by period of stay and star classification 
 Stars Apr-Jun14 Jul-Aug14 Sep14 Apr-Jun15 Jul-Aug15 Sep15 
Sardinia 
1 0.0 - - - 2.7% - 
2 7.5 4.2% 14.6% 3.6% 20.8% 9.9% 
3 8.4 11.6% 14.7% 7.9% 13.6% 12.5% 
4 14.2 21.1% 23.6% 18.4% 31.1% 26.5% 
5 9.5 25.6% 19.8% 42.2% 58.5% 40.2% 
Total 10.6 17.2% 19.1% 14.1% 24.9% 20.4% 
Sicily 
1 12.1 0.0% - 2.7% 0.9% 2.8% 
2 9.0 6.5% 12.4% 6.6% 13.0% 9.5% 
3 10.3 11.2% 14.8% 10.9% 13.8% 13.0% 
4 13.2 17.8% 20.9% 22.1% 23.3% 23.6% 
5 27.5 38.8% 34.3% 42.7% 44.0% 45.8% 
Total 12.5 15.7% 18.4% 15.6% 19.7% 19.1% 
Corsica 
2 5.7 9.8% 9.2% 5.0% 10.4% 14.5% 
3 8.9 12.6% 12.4% 12.8% 19.5% 17.4% 
4 12.1 19.5% 18.1% 30.5% 43.9% 33.9% 
5 17.7 27.3% 22.9% 38.2% 53.0% 43.1% 
Total 9.7 14.1% 13.7% 15.7% 24.1% 21.9% 
Balearics 
1 5.4 8.7% 9.9% 3.4% 8.5% 9.6% 
2 8.0 10.9% 15.6% 5.7% 12.8% 12.1% 
3 11.3 15.5% 19.6% 10.5% 14.7% 14.2% 
4 16.0 21.0% 20.5% 18.7% 26.1% 22.9% 
5 22.9 27.7% 22.5% 28.8% 45.6% 37.6% 
Total 12.3 17.7% 18.6% 12.5% 19.9% 17.2% 
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Table 4 – Percentage of observations with price variation between two consecutive 
booking days, by period of stay and booking time 
 
Booking 
time Apr-Jun14 Jul-Aug14 Sep14 Apr-Jun15 Jul-Aug15 Sep15 
Sardinia 
1-4 10.6% 19.0% 18.6% 21.6% 39.9% 26.1% 
7-20 10.8% 16.0% 19.7% 17.0% 29.7% 26.0% 
25-40 10.7% 18.4% 22.5% 13.7% 23.4% 23.5% 
45-70 8.8% 17.2% 11.2% 8.1% 20.2% 14.4% 
Sicily 
1-4 13.1% 16.0% 17.1% 24.9% 36.1% 30.2% 
7-20 12.2% 16.4% 19.6% 18.9% 24.0% 23.9% 
25-40 13.0% 14.4% 21.8% 14.8% 17.8% 20.6% 
45-70 10.9% 15.6% 10.4% 9.1% 14.5% 13.1% 
Corsica 
1-4 9.1% 17.7% 14.4% 22.5% 40.4% 33.2% 
7-20 9.1% 13.8% 14.4% 20.0% 29.3% 28.9% 
25-40 15.7% 12.4% 12.6% 15.0% 22.5% 24.1% 
45-70 5.7% 11.8% 3.4% 8.6% 18.9% 14.9% 
Balearics 
1-4 11.2% 17.6% 17.2% 21.7% 36.2% 28.5% 
7-20 11.4% 16.4% 18.5% 17.2% 26.4% 24.3% 
25-40 12.7% 16.3% 20.3% 13.6% 20.3% 21.8% 
45-70 10.4% 15.6% 9.0% 8.4% 17.1% 13.0% 
 
 
Figure 1– Estimated Probability of observing, for each day of stay, at least a price 
variation over the booking period - by star classification and customer rating clusters. 
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Figure 2 – Estimated Probability of observing, for each day of stay, at least a price 
variation over the booking period - by star classification and size clusters. 
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Figure 3 – Estimated Probability of observing, for each day of stay, at least a price 
variation over the booking period - by star classification and seasonal period. 
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Figure 4– Estimated Probability of a price change over any day of the booking period 
– by star classification and number of days from query to stay. 
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Figure 5– Estimated Probability of a price change over any day of the booking period 
– by seasonal period and number of days from query to stay. 
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Figure 6 – Estimated probability of a price increase given that a price variation is 
observed during the booking period. – by star classification and number of days from query 
to stay.  
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Figure 7 – Estimated probability of a price increase given that a price variation is 
observed during the booking period. – by season period and number of days from query to 
stay.  
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APPENDIX not for publication – List of localities by macro-destination 
Sardinia Sicily Corsica Balearics 
Alghero Castellammare del Golfo Ajaccio Alcudia 
Arzachena Catania Bastia Cala Millor 
Baja Sardinia Cefalù Bonifacio Cala Ratjada 
Bosa Noto Calvi Cala d´Or 
Cala Gonone Ragusa Lucciana Can Pastilla 
Cannigione San Vito lo Capo L ÎleRousse Can Picafort 
Chia Siracusa Porticcio Ciutadella 
La Maddalena Taormina Porto Ota El Arenal 
Olbia Trapani PortoVecchio Es Cana 
Orosei   Propriano Ibiza Town 
Palau   SaintFlorent Magaluf 
Porto Cervo     Mahón 
Pula     Paguera 
San Teodoro     Palmanova 
Santa Teresa Gallura     Playa d'en Bossa 
Villasimius     Playa de Muro 
      Playa de Palma 
      Port d'Alcudia 
      Port de Pollensa 
      San Antonio 
      San Antonio Bay 
      
Santa Eularia des 
Riu 
      Santa Ponsa 
 
